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THE BATTLE OF THE VERBS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
RECONCILIATION OF “VERBING” WITH TRADEMARK LAW AND
PRACTICES
Taylor Carrere*
In its recent decision in Elliot v. Google, the Ninth Circuit
reinforced Google’s trademark significance against claims that the
mark “google” should be canceled under the Lanham Act due to the
public’s verb usage of the trademark. The public’s “verbing” of
popular marks has become a particularly onerous problem for
internet and technology trademark owners like Google, who want to
encourage their products’ integration into pop culture while still
maintaining control of their mark. The court’s holding that evidence
of verb usage, without more, is not sufficient to prove that the
trademark has succumbed to genericide is a step in the right
direction in reconciling older trademark practices with modern
language use and the evolving realities of internet marketing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though the verb “google” has only recently been
introduced into the English language,1 most people would probably
understand a person stating they “googled something” to mean that
they used an internet’s search engine to learn more about a subject.
It would not be unusual to overhear one friend saying to another, “I
googled the long-term effects of eating those carbs. It’s not good.”
The listening friend will likely understand that when her friend says
she has “googled” carbs, she means that she has researched on the
internet how bad carbs are for her. Although using the word
“google” in this way has become second nature to the public,
Google2 has spent years3 reminding people that “google” is not just

1

Google, Inc. was founded in 1998, and the term “google” was not filed for
trademark protection until 1999, making the word about technology services less
than twenty years old. See Our Story: From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/our-story/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); see
also United States Patent and Trademark Office, reg. nos. 2884502 and 2806075,
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=toc&state=4803%3At08erp.2.151 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2017).
2
Google is now a subsidiary of a larger company called Alphabet, but this paper
continues to refer to Google as the company which owns the trademark to be
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s usage in Elliot v. Google, Inc. 860 F.3d 1151
(9th Cir. 2017), which began before the company became part of the larger
corporation in October of 2015. Further, the Google search engine is still under
the Google umbrella of the company. See Avery Hartman, Here Are All the
Companies and Divisions within Alphabet, Google’s Parent Company, BUS.
INSIDER:
TECH
INSIDER
(Oct.
26,
2016
12:37
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/alphabet-google-company-list-201610/#google-officially-became-alphabet-in-october-2015-with-the-aim-to-allowits-different-businesses-to-operate-independently-and-move-faster-eachdivision-has-its-own-ceo-with-google-cofounder-larry-page-taking-the-helm-ofalphabet-1.
3
Suzanne Choney, No Googling, Says Google–Unless You Really Mean It,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2013, 3:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/nogoogling-says-google-unless-you-really-mean-it-1C9078566 (detailing some of
the lengths Google has gone to since 2006 to ensure that those using its brand as
a verb do so in specific reference to the Google search engine).
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something you do on the internet. First and foremost, it is a
trademark—and an extremely valuable one at that.4
Ironically, a trademark’s transition from noun to verb signifies
not only that the trademark has been successfully integrated into the
minds of consumers, but also that it may be on its way to the generic
graveyard.5 Genericide occurs when a valid trademark evolves from
being used for identifying a single product under a brand name to
representing an entire category of products not connected to the
brand.6 Once a mark loses its ability to signify the source of the good
or product being sold, it no longer qualifies for trademark
protection.7 Other brands have already fallen victim to genericide,
and few people, if any, remember that terms such as “trampoline,”
“escalator,” and “aspirin” were initially trademark-protected
brands.8 Over time, these terms became generic because they came
to signify the product, rather than the producer, in the public’s
mind.9
For the past five years, Google has been engaged in extensive
litigation to protect its trademark against allegations brought by
Chris Gillespie and David Elliot, who wanted to use the mark in
their own trademark registrations as part of an academic
experiment.10 Gillespie and Elliot argued that the term “google” was
4

Rami S. Yanni, Genericization of a Giant: Has the World’s Most Valuable
Brand
Become
Generic?,
CORP.
COUNS.
(Apr.
27,
2017),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202784727374/Genericization-of-a-GiantHas-the-Worlds-Most-Valuable-Brand-BecomeGeneric?slreturn=20170816132911.
5
Scott Brown, “I Tweeted on Facebook Today:” Re-Evaluating Trademark
Genericide of Internet-based Trademarks, 7 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 457, 482
(2012).
6
Id. at 460.
7
Id.
8
Mary Beth Quirk, 15 Product Trademarks That Have Become Victims of
Genericization, CONSUMERIST (May 16, 2017, 3:36 PM),
https://consumerist.com/201
9
Id.
10
Mary Beth Quirk, Google Avoids Genericide, Will Remain a Protected
Trademark,
CONSUMERIST
(May
16,
2017,
3:58
PM),
https://consumerist.com/2017/05/16/google-avoids-genericide-will-remain-aprotected-trademark/; see also Yanni, supra note 4 (explaining that Gillespie, who
originally registered the 763 domain names, claimed he was doing so as part of
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generic because the majority of the public understood the term,
when used as a verb, to mean to search for information on the
internet.11 Because generic trademarks cannot be given trademark
protection,12 Gillespie and Elliot argued that they should be allowed
to incorporate the term into their business plans.13 After this
argument was rejected by the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”)
and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
Gillespie and Elliot appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit,
which decided the case in May of 2017.14
This Recent Development argues the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Elliot v. Google, Inc.—that verb usage of a trademark does not
necessitate its death by genericide—is an accurate and important
step in reconciling trademark law with modern language practices
and internet marketing. It progresses in four parts. Part II explains
the legal backdrop of the genericide problem by detailing the
Lanham Act and the genericide doctrine.15 It also explains the
linguistic concept of “verbing” and the effects it has on trademark
law and practices. Part III presents the background for the Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc. which upheld
Google’s trademark against a Lanham Act petition that sought to
cancel the trademark.16 Part IV discusses how the Ninth Circuit’s
decision accurately reflects the goals of trademark law and
acknowledges the evolution of language and internet marketing
realities and discusses possible revisions to trademark law to better
reflect these new realities.

an academic expert to test a computer program he designed to prevent cyber
piracy).
11
Yanni, supra note 4.
12
Brown, supra note 5, at 460.
13
Yanni, supra note 4.
14
Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
15
Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2007).
16
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1163.
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II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP
A. Lanham Act and the Genericide Doctrine
A trademark term falls into one of five basic classifications.17
These classifications act as a sliding scale, which courts use to
determine the amount of protection a trademark is given.18 At one
end of this scale, fanciful or arbitrary marks are considered to be the
strongest type of trademarks and, thus, receive the most protection
under both the common law and the Lanham Act.19 Fanciful marks,
such as “Google” and “Xerox,” are usually words invented solely
for the purpose of being used as trademarks; therefore, they have no
connection to common words used prior to their invention.20
At the other end of the scale, generic words garner no protection
because “they do not (or no longer) have the capacity for source
identification.”21 Without being able to distinguish the goods or
services for which the trademark represents, generic trademarks do
not serve one of the basic goals of trademark law: to protect
consumers from deceptive and confusing trade names by enabling
them to purchase a product they trust.22
The Lanham Act, first passed in 1946, provides trademark
owners with significantly more rights than were guaranteed under
either the common law or the previous Trademark Act of 1905.23
17

Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1805 (listing the five categories of
trademark status as arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and generic). The
Ninth Circuit combines arbitrary and fanciful terms into one category to recognize
four categories of trademark protections. Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1155. Because both
arbitrary and fanciful marks earn the same degree of trademark protection, this
distinction holds no real significance for the purposes of this article.
18
Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1805.
19
Id. at 1805, 1809.
20
Id. at 1807.
21
Id. at 1809. For example, “Apple” cannot be a trademark for a produce
company that grows apples because it is a generic name for the good that the
company supplies. However, it can be used as a trademark for a computer
company. Thus, the ability to register and protect a trademark is fact-specific.
Brown, supra note 5, at 460.
22
Brown, supra note 5, at 477–78.
23
Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1815 (explaining that under the common
law, the first user of a trademark could only obtain priority in the geographic
locations in which his or her mark had gained “goodwill”).
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The Act expanded the types of marks that qualify for federal
trademark protection and eliminated geographical restrictions on
these protections.24 The Lanham Act also provides for a cause of
action to cancel trademarks that have fallen to generic use.25
Specifically, the Act allows a petition to cancel a trademark to be
made at “any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name
for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is
registered.”26 The Act further states:
If the registered mark becomes the generic name for less than all the
goods or services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel the
registration for only those goods or services may be filed. A registered
mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of goods or services
solely because such mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique
product or service. The primary significance of the registered mark to the
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for
determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name
of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.27

Thus, the current version of the Lanham Act extends no protection
to generic words or terms and considers them to be abandoned and
invalid.28
Genericide refers to “the process by which a mark that was once
highly valuable and unquestionably protectable loses all trademark
status and value.”29 To determine whether a trademark is susceptible
to genericide, courts use the primary significance test codified in the
Act and articulated by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l

24

Id. at 1815–16.
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Sandra L. Rierson, Toward a More Coherent Doctrine of Trademark
Genericism and Functionality: Focusing on Fair Competition, 27 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 691, 701 (2017) (“The current version of the
Lanham Act extends no protection to words or terms considered generic, even if
the word or term was, at one point, a registered inherently distinctive trademark.
The Act codifies the doctrine of genericide by stating that, if a mark becomes ‘the
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used,’
for any reason, it is considered abandoned and is no longer a valid trademark.”).
29
Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1790.
25
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Biscuit Co.30 In Kellogg Co., the Supreme Court held that a company
could not claim trademark protection for the term “shredded wheat”
merely because it had a secondary meaning that was associated with
its particular product.31 Rather, the company had to show that “the
primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming
public [was] not the product but the producer.”32
Some circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have attempted to
refine the primary significance test by relying upon the “who-areyou/what-are-you” test.33 A trademark protected term will answer
the question, “who are you?,” while a generic term will answer the
question, “what are you?”34 For example, if asked to give the
significance of the term “trampoline,” one would likely explain that
it is a recreational device that one jumps on. The term “trampoline,”
therefore, answers the question “what is it?” rather than “who is it?”
because the answer involves explaining what the product does rather
than who produces it. On the other hand, if asked to give the
significance of the term “Samsung,” one would likely explain that it
is a brand of electronics and appliances. Because the answer
identifies the term with the producer rather than the product, the
term “Samsung” answers the question “who is it?” and would be
considered a valid trademark under the primary significance test.
In an attempt to answer these questions, courts examine
evidence of the trademark’s use in a variety of situations.35 The
burden is on the examining attorney to prove by clear evidence that
the mark is generic; this evidence can be taken from any competent
source that demonstrates the public’s primary understanding of the
term.36 This often includes evidence of the mark’s use in commercial
settings—such as competitors’ use of the mark, the trademark
30

Rierson, supra note 28, at 702–03; see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
31
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118.
32
Id.
33
Desai, supra note 15, at 1825.
34
Brown, supra note 5, at 461.
35
Id. at 462.
36
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 1209.01(c)(i) (9th ed.
2017),
https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/Oct2017#/Oct2017/TMEP1200d1e6993.html.
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holder’s use of the mark, testimony of members of the trade, and—
finally—surveys.37
Surveys are one of the most common forms of evidence offered
to prove a mark’s generic nature and are commonly used by courts
making genericide determinations.38 Modern genericide surveys
trace their origins to two seminal cases that employed significantly
different surveys in order to determine whether the trademarks in
question were indeed generic.39 The first, which will be discussed
later in this section, came from King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc.40 This “Thermos Survey,” as it has become commonly
known, consists of a series of open-ended questions aimed at
discerning how the consumer would ask for or describe a product in
order to determine if the trademark has become a generic name for
that product.41
The second, commonly known as a “Teflon Survey,” employs
mostly close-ended questions in order to determine whether a mark
is a brand name or a common name.42 This survey technique
originates from the case E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida
Int’l, Inc.,43 in which the plaintiff, Du Pont, conducted a survey
hoping to contradict evidence that its trademark, TEFLON, had
become a generic term for the non-stick coating on pots and pans.44
Du Pont started the survey by explaining the difference between
“brand names” and “common names.”45 Once assured that the
respondents understood this distinction, Du Pont then read a list of
eight words, including the disputed trademark, to the respondents
and had them answer whether they thought the word was a brand
name or a common name.46 Teflon Surveys have now become the
37

Brown, supra note 5, at 463.
E. Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of a
Species, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1119 (2009).
39
Id. at 1122.
40
321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
41
Jay, supra note 38, at 1122, 1124.
42
Id. at 1122.
43
393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
44
Jay, supra note 38, at 1125.
45
Id. at 1126.
46
Id.
38
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preferred survey method by courts attempting to establish the
trademark’s significance.47
In addition to considering evidence of commercial uses of the
trademark, courts also look at evidence of the public’s noncommercial uses, such as dictionary and media use of the trademark,
to determine whether the mark is generic48 despite the fact that
trademark holders have no legal right to control non-commercial
uses of their marks.49 Courts take non-commercial uses into
consideration based on the idea that they have the potential to show
the primary significance of the mark to the public.50 As the Second
Circuit noted, “[t]hough not conclusive, dictionary definitions of a
word to denote a category of products are significant evidence of
genericness because they usually reflect the public’s perception of a
word’s meaning and its contemporary usage.”51 The same rationale
applies to courts’ considerations of media and non-trade magazines’
uses of the trademark.52 Because of the circumstantial nature of this
kind of evidence, courts usually require additional evidence to
corroborate the idea that the trademark has become generic.53
B. Verbing and Its Effect on Trademark Law
Modern English speakers are certainly familiar with
nominalizations of verbs, as the English language is full of words

47

Id. at 1131.
Brown, supra note 5, at 464.
49
Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1835.
50
Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t It
be a Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity
Between the “Primary Significance” Tests for Genericness and Secondary
Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 160–61 (2007).
51
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grotanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 (2d. Cir. 1999).
52
Jessica E. Lanier, Effective Policing: Giving Trademark Holders a PreEmptive Against “Genericide”, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 247, 257–58 (2014).
53
Brown, supra note 5, at 464. As Pierce notes, however, dictionary entries and
other non-trade publications do not necessarily demonstrate that a trademark is
used generically by the public at the time of their publication, but, rather, cause a
trademark to be seen as generic by their readers. In short, they may not reflect a
term’s generic nature so much as cause it to become generic. Pierce, supra note
50, at 160–61.
48
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that were once verbs and have become nouns.54 Traditional
nominalizations, such as the words “acceleration” and
“intimidation,” have obvious roots in their verb counterparts, but
English speakers have recently become even more transparent in
their use of nominalizations by foregoing the alteration of the verbs
and, instead, using their verb form as nouns.55 “Hey, I like your
build,” is an example of the latter.56
Although the opposite of nominalization, verbing, may seem
like a more recent phenomenon, it has actually been around for
centuries, with some of the best known historical examples coming
from William Shakespeare’s plays.57 In Shakespeare’s historical
play, Richard II, the Duke of York tells young Henry Bolingbroke
(soon to be Henry IV of England) who has returned from exile
without the king’s permission, “Grace me no grace, nor uncle me no
uncle/ I am no traitor’s uncle”58 With this turn of phrase, the Duke
of York has turned the honorary titles “your grace” and “uncle” into
verbs in order to express his disgust at his nephew’s disregard of his
and the king’s authority. The verbing that is so well employed here
by Shakespeare has now become a ubiquitous part of our everyday
conversations, so much so that even the Oxford Dictionary has
recognized some of these verbified nouns.59
Although versatility is undoubtedly a strength of the English
language, it also poses problems for trademark owners who are
taught never to allow their brand to be used as nouns or verbs. What
may be even more problematic for trademark owners than the
American public’s tendency toward nominalization is the public’s
growing fascination with “verbing.”60 “Defined, verbing is the
54

Henry Hitchings, Those Irritating Verbs-as-Nouns, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 30,
2013, at SR9.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Anthony Gardner, You’ve Been Verbed, THE ECONOMIST 1843 (2010),
https://www.1843magazine.com/content/ideas/anthony-gardner/youve-beenverbed.
58
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, sc. 3 ll. 86–87 (Anthony B.
Dawson & Paul Yachin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1597).
59
Gardner, supra note 57 (highlighting the dictionary’s inclusion of “access”
and “reference” as verbs).
60
Brown, supra note 5, at 482.
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turning of a noun or other type of speech into a verb.”61 One reason
“verbing” is so popular is that it acts as a “vivid linguistic shortcut,”
allowing people to quickly convey their meaning through vivid
rhetorical images that are associated with the nouns.62 Instead of
saying, “I shoved my way through the crowd by making use of my
elbow,” one can simply say, “I elbowed through the crowd.”63
“Verbing,” therefore, is a quick and innovative linguistic shortcut.
Linguists have also noted that another reason for the popularity
of “verbing,” especially in the trademark arena, is its usefulness in
filling the “conversational vacuum” that occurs when innovative or
new products come to the market.64 Furthermore, “when a business
is the first to find widespread success and adoption of their service
or product, they embed themselves in popular culture”65 and have a
higher risk of being verbed. The internet and many of the
technological advancements that accompany it are only a few
decades old.66 Keeping this in mind, along with the understanding of
how these technologies have become embedded into our daily lives,
one can appreciate the struggle that internet trademark owners, like
Google, face in trying to prevent verbing of their marks.67
61

Id.
Chi Luu, Do You Even Language Bro? Understanding Why Nouns Become
Verbs, JSTOR DAILY (Mar. 9, 2016), https://daily.jstor.org/in-which-we-sciencewhy-nouns-become-verbs-because-language/.
63
Id.
64
Laura Heymann, Who Is the Reasonable Person? The Grammar of
Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1347 (2010).
65
Michael Pignataro, Powerful Brands: The Significance of Branding-Verbing,
COREPHP, (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.corephp.com/blog/powerful-brands-thesignificance-of-brand-verbing/.
66
History
of
the
Web,
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
FOUND.,
https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2017).
67
Luu, supra note 62 (noting that invented creative verbs from proper nouns
have become prolific especially among the internet). Although, as discussed in
the next section, Twitter allows verb usage of its mark, many of the often-verbed
brands strictly prohibit such usage. See Skype Trademark and Brand Guidelines,
SKYPE,
at
5,
https://secure.skypeassets.com/content/dam/scom/pdf/skype_brand_guidelines.p
df (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (emphasizing that “Skype” can only be used an
adjective or a proper noun); TiVo Brand Guidelines, TIVO, at 4.1,
62
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C. Examples of Lost Trademarks
Traditionally, trademarks have been threatened when the public
uses a brand name meant to be an adjective as a noun to identify the
product for which the trademark is known. “Some famous marks
that have lost their protection through genericide include aspirin,
shredded wheat, and escalator. All of these terms started as source
identifiers, but for various reasons became identified in the public’s
mind with the type of products to which they were attached.”68
Significantly, some of the classical examples of trademark
genericide involved innovative technology or products that had not
seen significant commercial use before being trademarked; thus,
these product names helped fill the linguistic vacuum that their
existence created, but at the expense of their trademark protections.69
For example, in Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 70 the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) held that the
word “escalator,” though originally trademark protected, was no
longer a valid trademark because in the public’s mind it had come
to represent the product rather than the producer.71 In making this
determination, the USPTO noted that the parties did not dispute that
the word “escalator” was only recognized by the public as a moving
stairway rather than the Otis Company’s trademark.72 It further
pointed out that the company itself used the term generically in
patent applications and advertisements, leading the USPTO to
determine that such usage supported the conclusion that the
company had abandoned its trademark.73
In King-Seeley Thermos Co., the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court’s determination that the trademark “THERMOS” had
http://assets.tivo.com/assets/resources/TiVo_Brand_Guidelines_v3.3a.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2017) (emphasizing that “it is never permissible to use any of [its]
trademarks as verbs”).
68
Brown, supra note 5, at 460.
69
See generally Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q 80 (1950)
(escalator); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963) (thermos).
70
85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 80.
73
Id.
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become a generic word for “vacuum-insulated” bottle because of the
widespread use of the trademark as a stand-in for the product itself.74
Although King-Seeley Thermos Co. had attempted after an initial
period of advertising to market “THERMOS” as a descriptive
trademark, the Court found there was ample support for the district
court’s finding that the substantial majority of the public knew the
term “thermos” as a vacuumed-sealed bottle without its trademark
significance.75 The Court emphasized, however, that a mark having
a dual meaning was not dispositive to the issue of genericness:
[A] mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the
public as an indication of the nature or class of an article. In order to
become generic[,] the principal significance of the word must be its
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of
its origin.76

While these cases pertain to trademarks falling to genericide
because of the public’s use of them as nouns, modern technology
trademark owners possibly have a greater problem in the public’s
use of their trademarks as verbs. Xerox is a classic example of a
modern technology trademark owner’s fight against verbing.77 The
company’s 914-model was the first copier widely known to the
American public.78 Consequently, the public began to use “xerox”
as a general verb for photocopying.79 Out of fear of losing its
trademark to genericide, Xerox launched an aggressive advertising
campaign80 to educate the public about its brand and policed the use
74

King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 578.
Id. at 579–80 (“The results of the survey (conducted at the behest of the
defendant) were that about 75% [o]f adults in the United States who were familiar
with containers that keep the contents hot or cold, call such a container a
‘thermos’; about 12% [o]f the adult American public know that ‘thermos’ has a
trade-mark significance, and about 11% [u]se the term ‘vacuum bottle’.”).
76
Id. at 580 (citation omitted).
77
When a Brand Name Becomes a Verb, BRANDMATTERS,
https://brandmatters.com.au/blog/when-a-brand-name-becomes-a-verb (Feb. 4,
2011) [hereinafter BRANDMATTERS].
78
Brown, supra note 5, at 469.
79
Id.
80
This campaign sought to educate the public about the difference between
Xerox’s brand name and the common name for the goods and services the
company offered. Gary H. Fletcher & Elina Slavin, Practical Tips on Avoiding
Genericide,
INT’L
TRADEMARK
ASS’N
(Nov.
15,
2011),
75
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of its name by sending letters to those who “verbed” the brand even
in noncommercial contexts.81 Although the un-capitalized “xerox”
is now listed as a verb by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the
corporation has refused to acknowledge the word’s dual meaning
and has not given up its campaign to prevent verb-use of its
trademark.82 Because of its efforts to educate the public and its
aggressive policing of its mark, Xerox has not lost its trademark
protections.83
Xerox is not alone, however, in this battle-of-the-verbs; other
modern technology trademark owners are now facing the problem
of how to balance the public’s verbing of their brand with their
desire to make their product ubiquitous in consumers’ daily lives. In
a world where people regularly discuss their plans to “Netflix” and
“Skype” all day, trademark owners straddle a fine line. Although
Twitter, unlike Xerox, has accepted the verb-usage of its trademark,
the company emphasizes that it must be used with a capital letter
and reserves the right to enforce its guidelines through litigation.84
Thus, even the more accepting trademark owners have expressed
some wariness of the verb usage of their marks.
Further, Twitter has shown its willingness to join the trademark
battle by its drawn-out struggle to gain the rights to trademark the

http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/PracticalTipsonAvoidingGenericide.as
px. An example of one of the ads used during the campaign is the following: “You
can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if you copy a copy on
a Xerox copier.” Id. For further examples of trademark advertising meant to
educate the public, see Megan Garber, “Kleenex Is a Registered Trademark” (and
Other
Desperate
Appeals),
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
25,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/09/kleenex-is-a-registeredtrademark-and-other-appeals-to-journalists/380733/.
81
Becky Peterson, This 1979 Letter to The New York Times Shows Just How
Much Xerox Hates People Using Its Name as a Verb, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2017,
5:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/old-letter-to-new-york-times-xeroxtakes-trademark-very-seriously-2017-7.
82
Id.
83
Brown, supra note 5, at 466–67.
84
Brand
Guidelines,
TWITTER,
at
12–13,
https://about.twitter.com/content/dam/about-twitter/company/brandresources/en_us/Twitter_Brand_Guidelines_V2.0.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2017).
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term “Tweet.”85 Beginning in 2009, Twitter filed two applications to
trademark the term but ran into complications because another
company owned the trademark.86 After initiating a lawsuit against
the company in 2011, Twitter negotiated with the company to
acquire the mark.87 After the transfer, however, Twitter worried that
its “Tweet” mark would be treated similarly to Xerox’s mark
because of its verbing potential and eventually accepted verb use of
the trademark in an attempt to control it.88 The aggressive
negotiations Twitter used to gain the mark not only emphasize some
of the problems innovative trademark owners face in establishing
their brands, but also highlight the lengths they are willing to go to
control their marks.89 Twitter is not alone, of course, in its struggle
to control the verbing of its mark, and Google’s recent legal battle
in the Ninth Circuit merely adds another chapter to this drawn-out
story.

85

Amir Efrati, Twitter Will Get “Tweet” Trademark, Settles Lawsuit, WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
BLOG,
(Oct.
10,
2011,
8:17
PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/10/10/twitter-settles-lawsuit-over-”tweet”trademark/?mod=e2tw.
86
Twitter Gets Shut Out Once More, U.S. Trademark Office Won’t Grant Jack
Dorsey Trademark for ‘Tweet’, NY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011 4:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/twitter-shut-u-s-trademarkoffice-won-grant-jack-dorsey-trademark-tweet-article-1.121949. Twittad, the
company who beat out Twitter for the registration of the word “tweet,” provides
“a service that matches Twitter users with advertisers to sell spaces on their
profiles based on the number of followers they have.” Id.
87
Efrati, supra note 85.
88
Scott Martin, Is Twitter’s ‘Tweet’ Trademark at Risk?, USA TODAY (last
updated
Oct.
5,
2013,
11:51
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/10/04/is-twitters-tweet-trademark-atrisk/2923269/ (noting that “tweet” is defined as a noun by the Mariam-Wester
dictionary: “a post made on the Twitter online message service”); see also Brand
Guidelines, supra note 84, at 12–13 (permitting use of “Twitter” and “Tweet” in
noun and verb format but requiring that both terms be capitalized to emphasize
their trademark significance and that they be used only in connection with
Twitter’s “Tweet and “Retweet products”).
89
For a criticism of Twitter’s attempts to gain trademark protection for “Tweet”
see Henry Blodget, Hey, Twitter, Enough of This Crap About “Here’s How You
Can Use the Word Tweet,” BUS. INSIDER: TECH INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2010 9:36 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-trademarks-tweet.
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III. ELLIOT V. GOOGLE, INC.: THE NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS
GOOGLE’S TRADEMARK
In early 2012, Chris Gillespie, a man who is now famous for
challenging Google’s mark, registered 763 domain names that
included the word “google” with another specific brand, person, or
product to create domain names such as “googlebarackobama.net”
and “googledisney.com.”90 Although Gillespie claimed that he
registered the domain names as part of an academic experiment to
test a computer program he was developing to prevent cyber piracy,
Google filed a complaint under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy.91 The company argued that Gillespie’s use of its
trademark amounted to cybersquatting,92 which is the act of
“registering, selling or using a domain name with the intent of
profiting from the goodwill of someone else’s trademark.”93
Gillespie claimed he chose the term “google” as a common
denominator in all of the domain names because “google” was “both
a generic term and a very highly searched term.”94 Google argued,
and NAF agreed, that the domain names were confusingly similar to
Google’s trademark and that Gillespie had registered them in bad
faith.95
Soon thereafter, David Elliot, a third-party beneficiary of
Gillespie,96 filed a petition in an Arizona district court, seeking to
cancel Google’s trademark under the Lanham Act,97 which Gillespie
later joined.98 The petition argued that “google” had become
synonymous with the act of searching on the internet and, thus,

90

Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2017).
Yanni, supra note 4.
92
Id.
93
Cybersquatting: What Is It and What Can Be Done About It?, nolo.com,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/cybersquatting-what-what-can-be29778.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
94
Yanni, supra note 4.
95
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1154.
96
Sarah Mitroff, A Disgruntled Gentleman Honestly Thinks He Can Strip
Google of Its Trademark, VENTUREBEAT, (May 25, 2012, 4:52 PM),
https://venturebeat.com/2012/05/25/google-sued-over-trademark/.
97
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
98
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1154–55.
91
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qualified for cancellation under the Act because it was generic.99
When both parties filed summary judgment motions on the issue of
genericness, the Court sided with Google.100 It ruled that the relevant
inquiry was not, as Elliot argued, whether “google” was most
commonly used as a verb to denote the act of searching for
something on the internet, but, instead, whether the public primarily
understood the term “google” to be a generic word for search
engines, and that Elliot failed to produce sufficient evidence to
support this claim.101
At trial, Elliot attempted to introduce two surveys to prove that
Google’s mark was generic.102 The District Court refused to admit
the first survey because it was conducted by Elliot’s counsel,
Wirtz,103 and there was no evidence regarding its reliability or that it
was made in accordance to generally accepted principles of survey
making.104 The second survey Elliot offered at trial was a modified
version of the Thermos Survey conducted by a survey expert who
asked respondents, “If you were going to ask a friend to search for
something on the Internet, what word or phrase would you use to
tell him/her what you want him/her to do?”105 Just over half of the
99

Id.
Id.
101
Id. As will be discussed more in-depth later in this section, Elliot argued that
trademarks can serve their purpose only if they are nouns and that “verb use
automatically constitutes generic use.” Id. at 1158.
102
Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1167–71 (D. Ariz. 2014).
103
The Court noted that Wirtz did not have any expertise in survey
interpretation as claimed at trial and was particularly concerned with the conflict
of interest that would occur because Wirtz could not testify about the reliability
of the survey and continue to be Elliot’s counsel. Id. Wirtz’s surveys prompted
respondents to select among one of three answers to the prompt: “I most often use
the word google to mean.” Id. at 1167. The answer that respondents could choose
from were “to search something on the internet”; “the name of a specific search
engine”; and “the internet (in general)”. Id. Of the 1,033 respondents for the first
survey, 52.2% answered that they most often used “google” to mean to search for
something on the internet. Id.
104
Id. at 1168; see FED. R. EVID. 702(c)-(d) (establishing that expert opinions
must be based on reliable methods and principles to be admissible).
105
Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69. This question was the only question in the
survey. Id. at 1169. As the district court pointed out, Thermos Surveys typically
ask several questions, and this survey did not test the primary significance of the
term to consumers or whether it was generic with respect to search engines. Id.
100
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251 respondents answered using the word “google.”106 Although it
admitted the second survey, the district court found this evidence
unpersuasive because it did not address the dispositive issue of
whether the primary significance of the term to the consuming
public was a generic word used to indicate search engines in
general.107
The Court also noted that Elliot produced no evidence that any
dictionary had defined the term “google” without referencing its
trademark significance and that none of Google’s competitors used
the term generically to refer to their products.108 Instead, all that
Elliot offered as additional support for his claim was that the media
sometimes used the term generically and that the co-founder of
Google once used the word generically.109 In ruling that Elliot had
not met his burden, the Court specifically addressed the semantic
issue of whether verb usage alone could be a dispositive factor in
determining whether a term was indeed generic.110 It stated, “[t]he
Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to judicially legislate federal
trademark law out [of] its ‘dark ages’ by sidestepping the statutory
test for primary significance and holding that frequency of verb use
is in and of itself sufficient to render a mark generic.”111
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Elliot argued that the district
court misapplied the standard of the primary significance test by
framing the inquiry as whether the public primarily thought of the
106

Id. at 1169. Specifically, 129 of the respondents used the word “google” in
some way to answer the question. Id.
107
Id. at 1170. Google also offered survey evidence in the form of a Teflon
Survey, which asked 420 respondents identify six names as either brands or as
common names. Id. at 1166. Although not told that “both” was an acceptable
answer, some respondents said that some of the names listed were both. Id.
“Excluding 19 respondents who answered they do not conduct searches on the
internet, 93.77% of the respondents identified “Google” as a brand name, and only
5.25% identified Google as a common name.” Id.
108
Id. at 1171–73. What the court means when referring to Google’s
competitor’s use is that Microsoft and Yahoo do not call their search engines a
“google.” Instead, they have their own brand names for their search engines—
Bing and Yahoo! Search, respectively.
109
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of Larry Page’s statement for google users
to “keep googling,” see infra Part IV.
110
Id. at 1174.
111
Id.
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term “google” as a generic term for search engines.112 Instead, he
argued, the Court should have framed the inquiry as whether the
public primarily used the word “google” as a noun identifying
Google’s trademark or as a verb for the action of searching on the
internet.113 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this argument for two
reasons: (1) the argument “fail[ed] to recognize that a claim of
genericide must always relate to a particular type of good or
service,” and (2) it made the assumption that verb usage constitutes
generic use.114
First, the Court held that Elliot’s criticisms of the district court’s
framing of the inquiry were unfounded because “the district court
properly recognized the necessary and inherent link between a claim
of genericide and a particular type of good or service.”115 To support
this conclusion, the Court pointed to the language of the Lanham
Act that allows a party to request cancellation of a trademark “when
it becomes the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which
it is registered.”116 The Court did not address its reasons for believing
why “google” must generically refer to search engines rather than
the act of conducting searches through a search engine as Elliot
suggested. Its reasoning, however, appeared to be grounded in the
district court’s determination that the contested Google
trademarks117 dealt specifically with Google’s search engine rather
than the act of searching things on the internet.118
The Court further noted the Lanham Act designated the standard
for cancellation of a trademark to be the primary significance of the
trademark protected term and focused on whether the trademark had
112

Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1157.
116
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012)) (emphasis and alteration in
original).
117
Elliot contested two of Google’s trademarks. Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F.
Supp. 3d 1156, 1159 (D. Ariz. 2014). The marks numbered 2884502 and 2806075
cover “computer software for creating indexes of information” and services that
provided this software to create personalized information respectively. Id.
(citation omitted). In short, the trademarks cover the search engine itself rather
than the consumer’s act accomplished through the search engine. Id.
118
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157 (referencing Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1159).
113
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become the generic name for certain goods or services that it
offered.119 Such a requirement, the Court held, “recognize[d] that a
term may be unprotectable with regard to one type of good, and
protectable with regard to another type of good.”120
Second, the Court chose not to focus on the traditional advice
regarding the grammatical use of trademarks when determining
whether Google’s mark was generic.121 Instead, it held that Elliot’s
argument that trademarks can only be valid when used as an
adjective to be a “semantic argument [that] contradict[ed]
fundamental principles underlying the protectability of
trademarks.”122 In doing so, the Court pointed to the legislative intent
behind the Lanham Act, in which Congress specifically
acknowledged that a person could use a trademark as a product, i.e.
as a noun, while still keeping the source of that product in mind.123
The Court also pointed to its prior decision in Coca-Cola v.
Overland, Inc.124 to support its conclusion, where the Ninth Circuit

119

Id. For an example of a trademark deemed generic because its primary
significance to the public was the product rather than the producer, see Bayer Co.
v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In Bayer, the Southern District
of New York determined that the trademark Aspirin had become generic and
passed into the public domain because people buying the product associated the
term “aspirin” as a name for the medicine rather than the company producing the
medicine. Id. at 510–512; see also Bill Donahue, Before Google, These 5 Brands
Fought Against ‘Genericide’, LAW360 (May 24, 2017 9:32 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/927986 (providing more examples of products
that fought genericide).
120
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157.
121
See generally Danica Mathes, Lessons from Google Surviving the
Genericide
Attack,
Law360
(July
7,
2017,
11:48
AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/938665/lessons-from-google-surviving-thegenericide-attack (listing traditional “dos” and “don’ts” to establish trademark
boundaries, including not using the trademark as a verb or a noun and using it as
an adjective to qualify the product’s generic name); see also 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.26
(5th ed. 2017) (noting the importance of designating a generic term with a
trademark, i.e. using the trademark as adjective, in preventing generic use of the
trademark).
122
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157.
123
Id. at 1157–58.
124
Coca-Cola v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982).
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held that “Coke” was not a generic term.125 In Overland, the Ninth
Circuit held that the use of “Coke” as a general term for soda did not
prove the trademark’s genericness because it failed to prove that the
customers did not think of Coca-Cola as the source of the soda.126
The Court held that in the same way a purchaser might use the noun
“Coke” in an indiscriminate way to refer to soda in general, without
subjecting Coca-Cola’s trademark to genericide, so too could an
internet user use the term “google” as an indiscriminate verb without
Google losing its trademark for such use.127
The Court noted that focusing on whether the mark had come to
represent the product itself, in this case search engines, was a
requirement “necessary to maintain the viability of arbitrary marks
as a protectable trademark category.”128 It also emphasized that if
Elliot’s theory that verb use alone could cause genericide was
correct, there would be no need to inquire into the consumer’s inner
thought process.129 Not doing so would contradict the purpose of
applying the primary significance test.130 In making this distinction,
the Court upheld a trademark that obviously retains its trademark
significance and gave popular trademark owners a reason to breathe
a little easier while still managing to uphold the goals of trademark
law.
IV. ELLIOT V. GOOGLE, INC.: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc., although
grounded in basic trademark principles, accounts for the evolving
nature of language and accurately reflects the main goals of
trademark law. More court decisions consistent with this opinion
could help alleviate the tension and needless litigation that comes
from such usage when it is obvious the brand still holds its
significance.
125

Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1158 (citing Coca-Cola, 692 F.2d at 1255).
Coca-Cola, 692 F.2d at 1255.
127
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1158.
128
Id. at 1157.
129
Id. at 1158.
130
Id. at 1157–58. Because the primary significance test is focused on how the
consumer perceives the product, it is essential to discover what the consumer
thinks about the product. Id.
126
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A. The Decision Accounts for the Evolution of Language
When rejecting Elliot’s argument that trademarks must be
adjectives in order to be valid, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[i]f Elliott
were correct that a trademark can only perform its sourceidentifying function when it is used as an adjective, then we would
not have cited a need for evidence regarding the customers’ inner
thought processes.”131 By applying the primary significance test to
Google’s trademark, the Court rejected the semantic dogma that has
plagued popular trademark owners for years, namely that the
public’s use rather than their perception of the trademark was the
most important factor in determining whether a mark is generic.132
The Court held the popularity of “googling” does not make
Google’s mark generic, acknowledging that language is not static
and applicable to only one situation; thus, it can be considered a step
toward easing some of the tension between traditional trademark
practices and modern language use. As one author points out,
current trademark laws encourage trademark owners to think of the
enforcement of their trademarks as “akin to thwarting adverse
possession: [t]he trademark’s inviolability must be defended against
any and all encroachments, lest the right to own the mark be
relinquished to those who are using it for some personal benefit.”133
These aggressive tactics are understandable when one considers
what is at stake. Under the “once generic, always generic” theory,
trademarks killed by genericide cannot be revived even by another
evolution in the English language.134 Thus, “[g]enericide poses the
ultimate threat, as it can reduce the value of the billion-dollar mark
to zero.”135 Had the Ninth Circuit ruled otherwise, it could have
131

Id. at 1158 (referring to the Court’s decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland,
Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982)).
132
Id. (“We have already acknowledged that a customer might use the noun
“coke” in an indiscriminate sense, with no particular cola beverage in mind; or in
a discriminate sense, with a Coca-Cola beverage in mind. In the same way, we
now recognize that an internet user might use the verb “google” in an
indiscriminate sense, with no particular search engine in mind; or in a discriminate
sense, with the Google search engine in mind.”).
133
Heymann, supra note 64, at 1318.
134
Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1849.
135
Id. at 1797.
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turned Google’s mark, worth billions,136 into a very expensive
trademark disaster.
Further, although there is undoubtedly some benefit in having
trademark owners actively managing their brands, applying strict
rules to trademark language can lead to undesirable consequences—
such as one of the most valuable and recognized brands in the world
arguing against genericide over mere semantics.137 “If trademark law
does indeed purport to reflect how the reasonable consumer acts in
the marketplace, that reflection should incorporate the fact that
language variation is an inherent characteristic of the English
language.”138 Thus, “verbing” should be recognized for the common
linguistic practice that it is, and other federal circuits should follow
the Ninth Circuit in acknowledging that its use does not necessitate
the conclusion that a trademark is generic. By explicitly refusing to
decide the case on verb usage alone, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
implicitly creates room for language to evolve naturally without
necessarily having deadly consequences for the trademarks that
inevitably rest on this language.
B. The Decision Reflects the Goals of Trademark Law
In addition to acknowledging the fluidity of language, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision reflects the twin goals of trademark law: (1)
encouraging the production of quality products and (2) reducing
customers’ cost of shopping and making purchase decisions.139
“[T]rademarks reduce the buyer’s cost of collecting information
about goods and services by narrowing the scope of information into
brand segments rather than have the buyer start a new search process
with each purchase.”140 By doing so, trademarks ensure that, with
136

The
World’s
Most
Valuable
Brands,
FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands/list/#tab:rank (last viewed Sept. 19,
2017) (listing Google as the second most valuable brand in the world with a
reported worth of $101.8 billion).
137
Id.
138
Heymann, supra note 64, at 1329; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 121,
§ 12:8 (“Buyers or users of a product may sometimes use a trademark in a generic
sense in casual conversation even though when questioned, those persons are fully
aware of the trademark significance of the term.”)
139
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 121, § 2.5.
140
Id.
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minimal effort, the consumer can get the quality of the product to
which they have grown accustomed.141
If the Ninth Circuit had held verb usage of a brand alone
constitutes genericide, as Elliot argued it should, the Court would
have eroded these principal protections. Elliot offered no real
evidence that the use of the term “google” as a verb in any way
eroded Google’s significance as a trademark to the public.142 As the
Arizona District Court pointed out, the evidence Elliot offered, if
taken for its full weight, only supported the conclusion that the
majority of the public used “google” as a verb to mean conducting
internet searches.143 It did not support any inference that the primary
significance of Google to the consuming public was to represent
search engines in general.144 In fact, no company’s trademark has
ever been canceled under the Lanham Act solely because of the verb
usage of its trademark.145 Because terms, including trademarks, can
have dual significance in the English language, canceling a
trademark solely because it has become ubiquitous enough to be
verbed would likely run contrary to the goals of trademark law by
confusing consumers who, although they use the trademark
indiscriminately as a verb, have come to expect the term to have
brand-significance in certain contexts.
The Teflon Survey used by Google as evidence that its brand
was not generic demonstrates this point. Even though respondents
were not told that they could identify the queried terms as both
common names and brand names, some of the respondents still
listed the terms as both.146 These respondents’ refusals to list the
proffered brands merely as one category or another demonstrates
that consumers can separate a brand name from its generic form
141

Id.
Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Elliot cannot
survive summary judgment based on ‘sheer quantity’ of irrelevant evidence. We
agree with the district court that, at best, Elliot has presented admissible evidence
to support the inference that a majority of the relevant public uses the verb
“google” in a generic sense. Because this alone cannot support a claim of
genericide, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Google.”).
143
Elliot v. Google, Inc. 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170 (D. Ariz. 2014).
144
Id.
145
Brown, supra note 5, at 483–84.
146
Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1166.
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depending on the context. By refusing to acknowledge this
dichotomy and taking this usage out of context, courts would likely
create greater confusion among consumers who have come to rely
on these trademarks to ensure that they get the quality of product to
which they are accustomed.
Everyone loves knock-offs at discounted prices, but no one
wants to pay for a knock-off if he or she is trying to purchase the
original. Similarly, if Google were to lose its trademark protections,
different companies offering similar “google” products could crop
up, creating mass confusion and potential disappointment for
consumers trying to buy legitimate Google services. This could
create confusion and disappointment among consumers if they
unknowingly attribute an inferior product to Google.
Further, such a holding would be a slap in the face to trademark
owners whose marketing techniques have made their brands
household names. Although the genericide doctrine has been used
to prevent companies from monopolizing brands that no longer have
trademark significance, trademark law also serves to protect
trademark owners who have worked hard to ensure their brands have
legitimate significance.147 For Google, this could mean that the
company’s successful marketing strategies over the last couple of
decades would reduce its brands value to rubble,148 and the many
consumers who have come to rely on Google as a source of their
technological services would be faced with trying to discern their
beloved brand from the many companies piggy-backing on
Google’s success while offering an inferior product.
This could also spell disaster for those who advertise on Google
and use the brand’s popularity to endorse their own products.149
147

Brown, supra note 5, at 477–78.
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1796–97 (noting that a company’s
brand “may be its most valuable asset,” and that “[g]enericide poses the ultimate
threat, as it can reduce the value of a billion-dollar mark to zero.”).
149
Currently, if a person is shopping around for shoes, ads will pop up in later
browsing sessions from companies like Zappos, Belk, and other shoe retailers,
offering similar style shoes to what that person was looking for originally. This is
a feature of Google’s Adword, and it can apply to any search done through
Google. For more information on Google’s Adword, see Chuck Topinka, How
Does Exactly Google’s Adword Work?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:04 PM),
148
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Currently, Google offers a wide range of advertising options for
business owners and other organizations who wish to advertise with
the company on various platforms150 and on varying budgets.151 In
2016, Google made a reported $19.1 billion from ad revenues.152 If
the company’s brand was to be ruled generic merely because it is
popular enough to be verbed, not only would Google stand to lose
serious money,153 the small businesses, startups, and other
companies who use Google as a way to promote their ideas and
products would lose valuable time and money in the process.
Such a holding would also fail to acknowledge the changes that
the internet has brought to the way trademark owners must market
their brands in order to make them successful. Far from sticking with
the traditional trademark precepts regarding marketing, modern
trademark owners, especially those with technology-related
trademarks, are encouraged by some advisors to “verb” their
marks.154 For example, one advisor advocated that trademark owners
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use “verbing” as a way to integrate their products with the public’s
daily lives:
The first question a marketer should ask when looking at a brand
assignment is: What can the brand do to translate its attributes into
actions? What behaviors can the brand take to reach its marketing goals?
What can the brand do to make itself more relevant, integral, helpful or
entertaining to its audience? A simple acid test: Show me, don’t snow
me.
It’s not surprising that, in a world of increasing transparency, actions
speak louder than words. Brands need to act thoughtfully, tangibly and
honestly to live the promises they make . . . not just talk about them.
They need to verb.155

Although her advice varies greatly from the traditional advice of
presenting one’s trademark in adjective form only, it has a commonsense ring to it when it comes to marketing: make something so
ubiquitous to people’s everyday lives that it literally becomes a part
of their vocabulary, and you have hit marketing gold. In fact, from
a marketing perspective, the brand’s popularity has reached an
ultimate high if a trademark becomes so ubiquitous that it is verbed,
despite the risk of genericide.156
Further, because the internet has changed the pace at which
brands become popular,157 some trademark owners are less
concerned with their brands being considered generic as they are
with them falling obsolete.158 If the company is the first to find
widespread success and adoption of its products, that company and
its products are often embedded into pop culture.159 Thus, advice like
that above, although risky, is hard for technology companies to
ignore. For example, in the late 2000s, Microsoft’s chief executive
Steve Ballmer said that he liked the name “Bing” for the company’s
155
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search engine because it “worked globally” and had the potential “to
verb up.”160 Despite the trademark implications, Ballmer hoped that
people would “bing it” rather than “google it”—a desire which has
probably changed given Google’s recent legal battles.
Even Google at one point embraced the verbing of its brand. Part
of Elliot’s argument before the Ninth Circuit regarding the
trademark’s genericness was that the company itself had used the
brand generically as a verb.161 Specifically, he cited to a “Google
Friends Newsletter” in which Google’s co-founder Larry Page told
people to “have fun and keep googling!”162 The Ninth Circuit
pointed out, however, that this evidence fell short of showing any
generic use on Google’s part because it did not demonstrate whether
Larry Page had Google’s search engine in mind when making the
statement.163 The Ninth Circuit’s decision, although not explicit in
acknowledging internet marketing realities, does help alleviate the
tension created by these conflicting interests and gives internet
trademark owners more leeway in promoting their brands.
C. Possible Changes to Trademark Law
To reconcile trademark laws with evolving language principles
and internet marketing realities, more federal circuits must follow
the Ninth Circuit’s finding that “verbing” alone does not destroy a
trademark’s primary significance to public consumers. Although no
United States courts have ruled that a trademark is generic within
the meaning of the Lanham Act based solely on the public’s use of
it as a verb,164 the threat of one doing so still lingers. As long as
courts continue to focus on the semantic use of the trademark as
evidence of its generic nature, trademark owners will continue to be
aggressive in their protection tactics.
In his concurrence in Elliot, Judge Watford emphasized that
courts should not completely disregard verb usage, arguing that
160
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indiscriminate verb use of a trademark could potentially be relevant
in determining if a trademark is generic.165 He argued that verb usage
would be relevant to the inquiry if the evidence showed that the
public used the “verbed” trademark to represent the product as a
species rather than the act accomplished by using the product.166
While this is possibly true, it is hard to see how the “verbed”
trademark would come to represent the product species itself unless
language further evolves to make such use practical. One generally
turns nouns into verbs to quickly get a point across. It is hard to
imagine one using a verb to represent a noun, which is what must
occur if verbing is to represent the product species as a whole.
Perhaps a better way to understand Judge Watford’s point is to
consider, for example, a person who uses Google’s Hangout to
“Skype” someone long distance.167 Because the products have many
similarities,168 unsophisticated users (and even those more familiar
with the latest technology) may not realize the distinction between
the two and use the latter when referring to the former. If evidence
were to show that the majority of the public considered “Skype” to
be any system used to make a video call regardless of the company
165
Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1164 (Watford, J. concurring). For a clearer
understanding of his point, think of the present case. If the evidence showed that
the term “google” had become a generic term for a search engine rather than the
act of searching on the internet, it would have been relevant evidence to the
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1157. The Court held that cancellation under the Lanham Act required that the
evidence of genericide relate to a particular product or service—in Google’s case,
the Google search engine. Thus, Elliot’s evidence of verb usage did not matter
where it counted. Id.
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that produced it, Skype could lose its trademark because the primary
significance of the trademark would be the generic product rather
than Skype as the producer.169 Thus, people who say that they
“Skyped” someone, but, in reality, used Google Hangout without
realizing that there was a difference in the two systems, would put
Skype’s trademark at risk.
Although the concurring opinion makes a good case for not
systematically ruling out verb usage in genericide determinations,
courts can still alleviate the negative effects aggressive trademark
policies have by shifting the focus of verb usage to the proper
context, namely the commercial arena. As some scholars argue,
courts consider too broad a scope of evidence when determining
whether a trademark has fallen victim to genericide.170 They argue
that non-competitive uses, such as dictionary entries and media use,
are not truly indicative of what constitutes a term’s “primary
significance” to the consumer in the commercial context and that
courts should focus instead on its use in its relevant marketplace.171
As they put it:
[U]se of a trademark as a common noun or verb, in a noncommercial
context, does not have the same direct impact on a mark’s sourceidentifying capacity as does an infringing use by the trademark holder’s
competitor. Such noncommercial uses typically indicate that mark is
functioning in a hybrid fashion (a fate that is practically inevitable for
the most famous trademarks).172

Because courts continue, however, to consider noncommercial uses
of trademarks as evidence of genericide, trademark owners continue
to feel the need to police even the fair use of their marks through
threats of litigation and a constant stream of cease and desist
letters.173
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One can argue, however, that eliminating all noncommercial
uses of trademarks may be tipping the scale too much in favor of
trademark owners who already have a significant advantage over
their competitors. While the evidence should appropriately focus on
the consumer’s perception in a commercial setting, dictionary and
media use does demonstrate, on some level, an understanding of the
general public and, thus, should not be discounted completely.
A Teflon survey, like the one offered by Google, is a good way
to determine if a brand is actually generic because it seeks to discern
whether the public recognizes a trademark as a brand or common
name.174 If properly conducted surveys reveal that the majority of
the public does not recognize the trademark significance of the
brand, then the mark is not fulfilling its identifying duty and should
properly be deemed generic.175 If these surveys do reveal a majority
of brand recognition, the trademarks are fulfilling their
identification purpose and should not be considered generic just
because of the public’s fair use of them.176
Further, judicial balancing of the different uses—putting more
weight on competitor’s use and consumer’s perception—would be
a more nuanced way to determine whether a trademark has fallen to
genericide and would allow trademark owners more room in
advertising their mark. Such judicial balancing would recognize that
a company like Twitter, who permits verb usage of its mark, is still
taking lengths to acquire and protect its marks despite its flexibility
in grammar. This balancing, although surely not eliminating the
preventive measures of wary trademark owners, would allow
trademark owners to better balance the competing interests of
marketing and protecting their brands while also acknowledging that
language is not concrete property to be only used one way.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc. to uphold
Google’s trademark under the primary significance test may have
come as no shock to anyone given the massive popularity the
company has earned throughout the world. The Court’s decision,
however, to hold that verb usage of a trademark alone does not
necessitate a trademark’s death by genericide is important in many
respects.
First, the decision acknowledges that language cannot be fixed
in time and that, in order to allow its natural progression, words must
be viewed in context to discern their meaning. The term “google”
may be used by the public as a verb for the act of searching for
information on the internet; however, as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
acknowledges, that does not mean that the public does not recognize
Google’s significance as a trademark in a commercial context. To
hold otherwise would place artificial barriers on the public’s use of
language and would undoubtedly make already aggressive
trademark enforcement policies even more so.
Second, the decision accurately reflects the goals of trademark
law and the realities of internet and technology marketing strategies.
Because words have dual meanings, and consumers may still
recognize a term’s trademark significance despite using it as a verb,
a court’s ruling that verb usage alone makes a trademark generic
would do little to reflect the goals of trademark law. In fact, doing
so would likely make it more difficult for consumers to discern the
product they have learned to trust from inferior ones marketed by
companies attempting to capitalize on the trademark’s success.
Further, the internet has accelerated the pace at which brands
gain a reputation and a following. Internet trademark owners are
currently forced to walk the thin line of integrating their brands into
popular culture while still retaining their trademark rights. The
Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, makes this decision easier by
refusing to place special significance on the syntax of the trademark
but instead focus solely on the primary significance of the term to
the public.
While courts should not eliminate verb usage in their analysis of
whether a trademark has become generic, they should place a greater
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emphasis on its use in commercial contexts rather than on the
public’s fair use. Although doing so will probably not be enough to
encourage all trademark owners to cease their aggressive trademark
policies, the overall effect would hopefully be to discourage the
obvious cybersquatting that occurred in this case and to reduce the
amount of pointless litigation and cease and desist letters that stem
from the public’s fair use of the trademark. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision is a victory for the consumer and the trademark owner
alike, in that the former can continue to “google” or “xerox” to their
hearts’ content while the latter is less galvanized to prevent such use.

